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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KARL WINSNESS AND ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 15501 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to facilitate continuity throughout this 
brief, the parties will be referred to herein either by name 
or in their respective capacities in the Court below: KARL 
WINSNESS AND ASSOCIATES - Plaintiff; M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS, 
INC. - Defendant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff Karl Winsness 
and Associates against Defendant M. J. Conoco Distributors, 
Inc. relating to a land lease agreement dated November 24, 1971, 
and subsequently modified by the terms of a judgment entered 
April 22, 1974, covering the lease of certain land by Plaintiff 
to the Defendant, located in Delle, Utah. 
Plaintiff-Lessor alleged that Defendant-Lessee breached 
the lease by failing to run the service station on a 24-hour 
basis, by incorrectly reporting the gallonage sold at the station, 
by failing to construct a sewage lagoon, and by failing to keep 
the station and premises in good repair. 
Defendant M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc. counterclaimed 
asserting that the Plaintiff had wrongfully encroached upon 
Defendant's leasehold and intentionally interferred with Defen-
dant's construction of the lagoon system. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff filed this action on August 25, 1975. During 
the pleading stage of this case several amended complaints were 
filed by the Plaintiff including one on March 22, 1976. Defen-
dant answered Plaintiff's first amended complaint on March 30, 
1976, while at the same time filing a counterclaim against 
Plaintiff. 
On June 14, 1977, a jury trial was commenced in Tooele 
county before the Honorable Peter F .. Leary. At the conclusion 
of Plaintiff's case Defendant moved for a directed verdict as 
to all five of Plaintiff's counts. Judge Leary directed a verdict 
as to four of Plaintiff's causes of action but reserved his ruling 
concerning the first cause of action for later determination. 
(Tr. A-45 to A-47) At the conclusion of the Court's ruling on 
Defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the Defendant rested 
asking leave of the Court to strike and dismiss its counterclaim 
against Plaintiff, which leave was granted. (Tr. A-48) Additional 
argument was given by both the Defendant and Plaintiff concerning 
a directed verdict as to Plaintiff's first count. The Court 
subsequently granted Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's first 
cause of action and dismissed the jury. (Tr. 533-535) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the judgment of the lower Court 
2 
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in favor of the Defendant M. J. Conoco Distributors Inc a 
, . an 
against Plaintiff Karl Winsness and Associates affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant views the purported statement of facts set 
forth in Plaintiff's brief as an argumentative exposition of 
the evidence. Accordingly, Defendant elects to make a brief 
statement of the facts involved in this case. 
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a land lease 
agreement dated November 24, 1971, wherein Plaintiff leased 
certain land to Defendant in Delle, Utah, for the purpose of 
constructing and operating a service station thereon. (Ex. P-51 
Delle, Utah, is located approximately 61 miles from Salt Lake 
City on the road to Wendover and consisted solely of an old, 
small cafe, motel and service station. (Tr. 33-34) The present 
service station is approximately one-half mile from the existing 
cafe and motel units. There is no permanent housing located at 
Delle and the only residents are those involved in operating 
the facilities just mentioned. There is no permanent water suppl; 
and all water must be brought in by truck. Subsequent to the 
signing of the land lease agreement Defendant built its service 
station which it opened to the public sometime in July, 1972. 
(Tr. 96) 
On October 3, 1972, Plaintiff filed an action in the 
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Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Civil No. 7761, 
claiming that Defendant had breached the land lease agreement 
dated November 24, 1971. 
At the conclusion of the trial of that action a 
stipulation was entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant 
resolving the issues between the parties which included Plain-
tiff's claim that Defendant had not operated the station on a 
24-hour basis. (Ex. P-6) 
The stipulation was signed on April 5, 1974, and pursuant 
thereto a judgment was entered by the Honorable Gordon Hall on 
April 22, 1974, which incorporated the provisions agreed to by 
the parties in their stipulation. (Ex. P-7) 
The 1974 stipulation required Defendant to build a 
lagoon sewage system for its new service station and the restaurant 
facility which was to be built by Plaintiff. (Ex. P-6) Defendant 
commenced to build the lagoon system and completed same in August, 
1974. (Ex. P-38) However, the Plaintiff not having constructed 
the proposed restaurant, there was never enough effluent to 
permit final testing and stabilizing of the plastic liner to 
the lagoon. (Tr. 280-281) 
On August 25, 1975, Plaintiff filed the complaint in 
this action setting forth four causes of action against Defendant. 
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had breached the lease agreement 
and 1974 judgment by failing to operate the service station on 
4 
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a 24-hour basis, by failing to complete the lagoon system, and 
by failing to keep the service station in good repair. Plain-
tiff also demanded an accounting of the number of gallons sold 
at Delle, Utah·, from 1974 to the time the complaint was filed. 
On March 22, 1976, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint 
seeking punitive damages and adjusting upward its damages for 
counts one, three and four. 
Defendant filed its answer to the amended complaint 
together with a counterclaim on March 30, 1976. Defendant allegec 
in its counterclaim that Plaintiff had interferred with the 
construction of the lagoon system and had breached the lease 
agreement by interferring with Defendant's quiet enjoyment of 
its leasehold. 
Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on February 
10, 1977, which was objected to by the Defendant. (R. 271-284) 
on April 4, 1977, the Honorable Peter F. Leary entered his pre-
trial order denying Plaintiff's motion to file its third amended 
complaint except as to the second cause of action. Following 
the pretrial order Defendant moved for leave to file an amended 
answer and counterclaim. (R. 381-388) Judge Leary allowed the 
filing of the amended answer but denied Defendant's motion to 
file an amended counterclaim. 
A jury trial in this matter was commenced on June 141 
1977, before the Honorable Peter F. Leary at the Tooele County 
5 
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courthouse. The issues which remained to be tried after pretrial 
were (1) Plaintiff's claim that the station was not operated on 
a 24-hour basis; (2) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant had failed 
to report the correct amount of gallonage sold at the station 
in Delle, Utah; (3) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant had failed 
to complete the lagoon system; (4) Plaintiff's claim that Defen-
dant had failed to keep the service station in good repair; (5) 
Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages; and (6) Defendant's 
claim that Plaintiff had interferred with the construction of 
the lagoon system and had breached the lease agreement by inter-
ferring with Defendant's quiet enjoyment of its leasehold. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DIRECTING A VERDICT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF ON ITS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND IS 
CORRECT IN LAW. 
This Court has held on numerous occasions that it is 
error for the Court to allow the jury to speculate on the evidence, 
and that unless there is competent evidence to support a cause 
of action the trial judge should not submit the question to the 
jury. In Jackson v. Colston et al., 209 P.2d 566, 116 Utah 295, 
Justice Latimer speaking for the majority stated: 
"It is fundamental ... that the Court may not 
permit the jury to speculate concerning defendants' 
6 
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liability; Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County 
Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 P.2d 660; and that 
the court is required to direct a verdict 
unless there is evidence from which the 
jury could reasonably find in favor of the 
plaintiff." 
See also Olson et al. v. Warwood et al., 225 P. 2d 725, 119 Utah 
175; and Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad c ~~~~~---'-~-:...::;...__;:.........::..:.::..=-=-=..=..:=.:::_:_:.:::..:::..::..:::..::.c:.:._~.=..=.::.:::~:.....::~o'....:.., 292 
P.2d 849, 4 Utah 2d 255. 
In the present case Plaintiff's evidence was such that 
Judge Leary had no choice but to direct a verdict in favor of 
the Defendant on Plaintiff's first cause of action. While Plain· 
tiff's witnesses testified that on several unspecified occasions 
the station was closed, not one of them testified as to what 
caused the closure or the duration of the closure. Plaintiff 
testified that he did not know why the service station was closec 
except that the operator on one occasion said he was tired. 
(Tr. 156) Mildred Sims, after admitting that there had been 
problems in getting help both at the current restaurant facility, 
which is approximately one-half mile from the service station, 
and at the service station, admitted that she didn't know the 
reason why the station had been closed on several occasions. 
(Tr. 203) If there was any consistent pattern running throughoui 
all of the testimony given by Plaintiff's witnesses it was that 
there was always difficulty in getting help at the service 
station, and that they were not aware of the reasons behind the 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
service station being closed at various times. Defendant submits 
that there was no evidence before the Court to aid the jury in 
determining whether Defendant had breached the lease agreement 
by not operating the service station on a 24-hour basis. The 
fact that the station was closed periodically was not evidence 
that Defendant was not making every effort to run the station on 
a 24-hour basis. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable 
to Plaintiff the jury had no guidance as to the number of times 
the station was closed, the time of day, how long it was closed 
or the reason for the closure. It would have been pure specu-
lation on the jury's part as to why the station was closed, the 
duration of the closure, and whether any of the closures resulted 
in a breach of the lease, or would have been excused as unavoidable. 
There were no parameters for the jury's guidance in assessing 
the damages, if any, occasioned by the closures of the station. 
Any action by the jury to assess damages would of necessity have 
been entirely conjectural and speculative. 
The rule for determination of damages recoverable by 
a plaintiff is summarized in 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 24, wherein 
it states: 
"The principle which will not allow the 
recovery of damages when their existence rests 
solely on speculation applies both to the fact 
of damages and to their cause. Thus, a . 
plaintiff cannot recover damages by proving 
only that the defendant has unla~fu~ly vio-
lated some duty owing to the plaintiff, 
8 
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leaving the trier of fact to speculate as 
to the damages; he must go further and 
prove the nature and extent of the damage 
suffered by the plaintiff and that the 
breacp of duty was the legal cause of that 
damage. Leaving either of these damage 
questions to speculation on the part of 
the trier of fact will prevent recovery. 
Therefore, no recovery can be had in those 
cases in which it is uncertain whether 
the plaintiff suffered any damage. Also, 
no recovery is allowed when resort to 
speculation or conjecture is necessary to 
determine whether the damage resulted from 
the unlawful act of which complaint is made 
or from some other source. 
In the present case, Plaintiff failed to show with any degreeo: 
certainty that he was in fact damaged. Further, Plaintiff did 
not introduce any competent evidence that he suffered any damage 
caused by the isolated closures of the service station. 
In Graham v. Street, 270 P.2d 456, 2 Utah 2d 144, this 
Court held: 
"'Only such damages are recoverable as are shown 
with reasonable certainty to have been sustained. 
Remote, contingent and conjectural losses will 
not be considered.'" 
The rent provision of the lease reads as follows: 
"RENT. To pay to the lessor a monthly 
'gallonage' rental on all gasoline and 
other motor fuel excluding diesel fuel 
sold to the storage tanks on the premises 
as follows: 
(a) For a period commencing May 15th 
through and including September 15th of 
the same year, payment shall be made at 
the rate of four cents (.04¢) per gallon; 
for the period commencing September 16th 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
through and including May 14th of the 
following year, payment shall be made at 
the rate of two cents (.02¢) per gallon. 
{b) To pay to the lessor as a monthly 
gallonage rental on all diesel fuel sold 
at the subject premises for the period 
commencing May 15th through and including 
September 15th of the same year, payment 
shall be made at the rate of three cents 
(.03¢) per gallon, and for the period 
commencing September 16th through and in-
cluding May 14th of the following year, 
payments shall be made at the rate of two 
cents (.02¢) per gallon. 
(c) In addition to the gallonage rentals 
above provided for, lessee shall pay to the 
lessor the sum of $300.00 per calendar month 
as 'ground rent' which shall be due and 
payable in advance on the first day of each 
calendar month. The $300.00 ground rent 
shall be applied first against the $6,321.15 
bill outstanding less payments which have 
been made on the prior lease dated the 9th 
day of January, 1970." (Ex. P-5) 
There is no evidence whatever in the record to show that Plaintiff 
had not been paid the exact amount due him under the rental pro-
visions of the lease. It is important to note that the lease 
does not require the Defendant to sell any particular quantity 
of gasoline whatever but only to pay to the Plaintiff the agreed 
upon ground rental and the gallonage rental on the gasoline 
actually sold. The lease is clear on its face concerning the 
rental payments and there is no contention by Plaintiff that the 
Defendant failed to pay rentals in accordance with the lease. 
Plaintiff complains that if the station had been kept open more, 
more gasoline would have been sold. This calls for speculation 
10 
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on two premises; (1) the failure to have the station open was 
the fault of the Defendant. There is no conclusive evidence 
on this point; and (2) that had the station been open, more 
gasoline would have been sold. There is no evidence of any 
kind on this point. The jury would have been left to unlimited 
speculation in making a determination of damages on the Plain-
tiff's claim. 
Plaintiff's only witness concerning the damages 
occasioned by Defendant's alleged failure to operate the service 
station on a 24-hour basis was Delbert Taylor, who had been a 
district sales representative for Husky Oil Company. (Tr. 446) 
Mr. Taylor testified that he had made estimates of the gallonage 
that several existing service stations owned by Husky Oil shoulc 
pump if they were operating at full capacity. (Tr. 4 4 9-450) 
He stated that in making his projections he took into considerat 
location, traffic count and past history. (Tr. 472) He further 
stated that based upon the traffic count, location and amount 
of gallonage pumped at the Delle service station in 1971, it 
was his opinion that the station should pump three times as much 
gallonage as it was pumping. 
The witness also testified that based upon the traffic 
count, which showed that, for example, the peak traffic at the 
Delle station on July 10, 1976, occurred between the hours of 
11:00 o'clock at night and 12:00 a.m., he determined that the 
11 
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station should be operated on a 24-hour-a-day basis. (Tr. 459 , 
462) However, it was later stipulated to by all counsel that 
Mr. Taylor had made a mistake in reading the traffic count in 
that the peak hour of traffic was from 11:00 o'clock a.m. to 
12:00 p.m., rather than from 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. as previously 
testified to by Mr. Taylor. (Tr. A-3) This error is extremely 
important inasmuch as the witness had testified earlier that his 
opinion concerning the hours of operation of the service station 
was based primarily upon the traffic count. 
Defendant submits that Mr. Taylor's testimony concerning 
the service station at Delle was totally lacking in credibility. 
He stated that if the station were open 24 hours a day it would 
do three times the business, yet he admitted that he had no 
personal knowledge of what percent of the time the station was 
presently open. His testimony concerning the 24-hour operation 
was based on a traffic count, however he later admitted that he 
had erred in his reading of the traffic count. He testified that 
his opinion was based to some extent on past performance, namely 
1971, yet he admitted the circumstances had changed drastically 
since 1971. Further, the fact of the matter is that the station 
in question was not even built until the middle of 1972. (Tr. 96) 
The clearest example of the lack of credibility of 
Mr. Taylor's testimony is found in reading the transcript of 
the trial wherein Mr. Taylor, in answer to a question posed to 
12 
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him by Plaintiff's own counsel concerning the projections he 
had made for other gas stations, stated: 
"Well, the projections I made for the 
service station, of course, I knew every 
aspect about the particular location .. 
That's every aspect. I knew the past his-
tory of them, I knew what the operator was 
like, I knew what the upkeep and maintenance 
of the service station, I knew what it 
looked like, I knew what the location was; 
whether or not it was easy to get in and 
out of, and everything that was in con-
sideration ... That way I could pick and 
choose it much better." (Tr. 505) 
In regard to the service station at Delle, Mr. Taylor admitted 
that he knew very little about the station or the conditions 
existing there with exception of the traffic count which he had 
misinterpreted. This witness' testimony lacked the credibili~ 
to permit submission to the jury. The Court, as a matter of 
law, could not submit this testimony, flawed as it was by the 
error in reading the traffic count on which Mr. Taylor based 
his computations and his admitted lack of knowledge of the other 
factors which he testified were essential to an adequate evaluat: 
It is further to be noted that Plaintiff did not offer any corre' 
tion or revision of the testimony of this witness after these 
fundamental errors were manifested. The Court, therefore, had 
no choice but to take this matter from the jury as there was no 
other evidence from which the jury could draw any conclusion as 
to the purported loss of business. 
13 
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In 1972 Justice Ellett wrote the followi'ng · concerning 
speculative damages: 
"If there is substantial evidence to 
~upport the findi~gs upon which the judgment 
is rendered, the Judgment must be sustained. 
The fact that it is difficult to calculate 
damages will not prevent an injured party 
from recovery. However, a judgment cannot 
be based upon mere speculation. . • Kratzer 
lost one day's sale of bread because of 
the wrongful eviction; but since it was in 
business after a few·hours' delay, it is 
not possible to say with any degree of 
certainty how much damage was caused to it 
other than the loss of the sale for that 
one day. Under the evidence given in this 
case any other damage which can be ascribed 
to the wrongful conduct of the appellant 
is purely speculative." Monter v. Kratzers 
Specialty Bread Co., 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 
40 (1972) (Emphasis added) 
In the Kratzer case, supra, there was a wrongful eviction which 
resulted in some definable damage from the bakery being closed. 
In the case at bar there is no evidence of the exact time when 
the station was closed, why the station was closed, or how long 
it was closed. For the trial judge to have permitted the jury 
to speculate not only as to whether there was a breach of the 
lease, but the duration of the breach and the damages resulting 
therefrom, if any, would have allowed a degree of speculation 
and conjecture which this Court has never permitted. 
Defendant submits the calculation of damages, if any, 
by the jury in this case would have been impossible and that 
Judge Leary followed clearly established principles of law as 
14 
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set forth in the cases cited above by granting Defendant's moti 
for a directed verdict as to Plaintiff's first cause of acti~. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DIRECTING A VERDICT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF ON ITS THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND IS 
CORRECT IN LAW. 
Plaintiff's third cause of action was for an alleged 
breach of the lease agreement as modified by a stipulation and 
subsequent judgment entered April 22, 1974. Plaintiff contende1 
that Defendant had failed to complete the lagoon system called 
for in those two documents. Defendant answered asserting that 
it had, in fact, built the lagoon system and that any delay in 
its completion was the result of governmental agencies and the 
Plaintiff, whose actions were beyond the control of the Defendill 
The provision of the 1974 judgment which relates to 
the lagoon system reads as follows: 
"The lagoon system provided for under the 
terms of this Stipulation shall be designed 
and constructed at the sole expense and cost 
of Defendant. Said lagoon system will be 
constructed in a square configuration which 
square shall be twenty (20) feet wider than 
the width of the ponds presently engineered 
by Nielsen and Maxwell Engineers. The lagoon 
system shall be designed and constructed 
to comply with the minimum requirements of 
the State of Utah and the County of Tooele. 
All expenses and costs of maintenance and 
operation of the lagoon system after com-
pletion of construction shall be borne equally 
15 
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by the parties. Each of the parties shall 
bear their own costs of connecting their 
respective facilities to the pump station. 
"That Defendant will commence construc-
tion of the lagoon system at Delle, Utah 
within a reasonable time after execution' 
of this Stipulation and will complete the 
same within one (1) year from March 8, 1974, 
except as may be excused due to acts of 
God, or other causes beyond the control of 
Defendant." (Ex. P-7) 
Following the 1974 judgment Defendant began to con-
struct the lagoon system and in fact the system was completed 
in August, 1974. (Ex. P-38) From August, 1974, until the 
time of trial Defendant had attempted to get final approval from 
the State Department of Health which has been denied for various 
reasons. Plaintiff produced no evidence at trial to dispute the 
fact that Defendant had indeed constructed a lagoon system as 
required by the stipulation. Instead, Plaintiff argued that Defen-
dant had breached its duty under the stipulation because final 
approval had not been given on the system by the State Board of 
Health. (Tr. 403, 407) 
Plaintiff called Art Maxwell who was the original 
engineer hired to develop the plans for the lagoon system. On 
cross-examination Mr. Maxwell gave the following testimony con-
cerning the feasibility of operating a lagoon system using only 
the waste water from the existing service station: 
"Very difficult, unless you--unless you 
pumped in or brought in from some other 
sources some to start it. 
16 
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"That 2,000 gallons a day would--
would strike a level some place where as 
the surface area increased the evaporation 
would increase, and it would start taking 
up its full 2,000. 
"Basing the 5,000 gallons on a need for 
two p~nds, it would appear that through 
the winter months that would build up to 
~erhaps five feet of depth in one pond; 
JUSt taking 40 percent of the total area. 
"And in the sUirnner months it would 
probably reduce that down to where you 
may have less than three feet. 
"At best I would say the operation would 
be very difficult with only a service station 
under full water supply; yes." (Tr. 280-281) 
(Emphasis added) 
The State Division of Health recognized this probl9 
and allowed Defendant to construct a small lagoon within the 
first lagoon to handle the waste water until the restaurant 
facilities were built. (Ex. P-47, paragraph 5) 
Defendant's construction of the lagoon system, at 
the very least, substantially complied with the provisions of 
the 1974 stipulation. The doctrine of substantial performance 
well stated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Sharp v. Twin Lakes 
Corp., 283 P.2d 611, wherein Chief Justice Merrill ruled: 
"It is now well established as the general 
rule with respect to building contracts that 
the law implies a substantial rather than 
a literal or exact performance of the terms 
of the contract. See Lloyd on the Law of 
Building and Buildings, 2d Ed. Sec. 31, 39; 
9 Am. Jur. 30, Building and Construction 
Contracts, Sec. 40; Annotations 24 L.R.A., 
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N.S., 327; 134 Arn. St. Rep. 679. It would 
seem to follow, a fortiori, that a covenant 
by a lessee to make improvements upon the 
leased premises is to be given a reasonable 
interpretation in the light of the purposes 
to be served and the result sought to be 
accomplished and that, as against the lessor 
substantial compliance with the covenant ' 
is sufficient." 
see also Larsen v. Thoresen, 254 P.2d 656. The Sharp case, 
supra, is similar to the case at bar in that it involved a cove-
nant by a lessee to make certain improvements to the leased 
property. 
Again the testimony at trial was that the lagoon system 
had been built since 1974 but the requirements for final approval 
had not been met because the system could not be made operable 
until the restaurant facility was built. The Defendant submits 
that the requirements of the 1974 stipulation were met by Defendant 
in that a lagoon system was built to dispose of the sewage from 
both the existing service station and the restaurant facility 
which was to be built by Plaintiff. If there was a breach, it 
was on the part of the Plaintiff and not of the Defendant. The 
fact that one of the considerations for Defendant's building of 
the lagoon system was Plaintiff's representation that he would 
build a restaurant is uncontroverted. The stipulated judgment 
reads as follows: 
"That Karl Winsness & Associates shall 
furnish to the Defendant at no cost an ease-
ment and sufficient land to allow a lagoon 
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system to.be constructed upon the premises 
of Karl Winsness & Associates at Delle Utah 
said lagoon system is to serve Defenda~t's ' 
existing service station and the new res-
taurant to be constructed in the future 
by Karl Winsness ... It is expressly under-
stood that the lagoon system is to serve 
the Defendant's service station and the new 
restaurant to be built by Karl Winsness only 
and that no other facilities or improvements 
will be connected to said lagoon system 
except other facilities mutually agreed upon 
at the new site, which will not overload the 
lagoon system." (Ex. P-7) 
An analogous situation to the one presented in this 
case is one of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. A Uniform 
Real Estate Contract provides that upon the payment of the 
entire consideration for the property the seller must provide 
marketable title to the buyer. However, until the buyer has 
paid for the property in full the seller is under no such du~. 
See Woodward v. Allen, 265 P.2d 398, 1 Utah 2d 220, and Naylor 
v. Solley, 111 P.2d 142, 100 Utah 130. In the present case 
Defendant had a duty to build the lagoon system which it did. 
However, the duty on the part of the Defendant to have the 
system approved for operation should not exist until there is 
a restaurant to use the facility, just as the duty to give 
marketable title under a Uniform Real Estate Contract does not 
exist until all of the payments are made. For Judge Leary to 
have allowed the Plaintiff to force the Defendant to expend an 
additional several thousand dollars on a lagoon system that is 
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inoperable without the restaurant facility would certainly 
have been error. 
Even if, for the sake of argument, the Defendant was 
technically in breach of the 1974 stipulation, Plaintiff was not 
damaged in any way as a result of said breach. During cross-
examination Karl Winsness gave the following testimony concerning 
the present condition of the lagoon system: 
"A. Now, assuming all of that work needed 
to be done, couldn't that be done in the space 
of two weeks? 
A. I don't know. I imagine it could. 
We'll have an expert I imagine testify on it. 
I talked to a gentleman in regards to it, 
the cost of it and the time on it. I don't 
know. I imagine. I've had experience with 
this before and we've never complied with 
anything I've asked them to do before, so--
Q. Well, now, I'm not .asking you whether 
you asked them to comply with it. I'm 
asking you if it isn't reasonable to assume 
that these changes could be accomplished in 
the length of time which it would require you 
to construct your restaurant. 
A. Well, yes. They could be in the time 
I construct it; yes." (Tr. 145-146) (Emphasis 
added) 
When asked about why he had not built the restaurant 
Mr. Winsness answered as follows: 
"Q. That's all. Now Mr. Winsness, had you 
at any time ever applied for a building permit 
for your restaurant? 
A. Yes. 
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"Q. When? 
A. 1971, I believe. 
Q. Was it granted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So then you had a proper building 
permit to go ahead and build? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did the Board of Health ever 
tell you that you could not build your 
facility? 
A. They didn't tell me I could not 
build it; no." (Tr. 154-155) 
From Karl Winsness' own testimony it is clear that 
the decision not to build the restaurant was Plaintiff's and 
no one else's. Had the Plaintiff begun construction of the 
restaurant by his own admission, there would have been little 
difficulty in completing the necessary adjustments in the lagoon 
system far in advance of the restaurant's completion. Until 
the Plaintiff constructs a restaurant facility to comply with 
the clear understanding stated in the 1974 stipulation there shoe 
be no duty placed upon the Defendant to have the system finally 
approved for operation inasmuch as there won't be sufficient 
sewage to operate it. 
The fact is that Plaintiff has suffered no damage 
whatever as a result of the lagoon system not being approved 
by the Board of Health. Until there is a restaurant to use 
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the lagoon system the lack of final approval of the system 
is of no consequence to Plaintiff. 
Point III 
JUDGE LEARY'S EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 35 WAS CORRECT IN LAW INASMUCH AS 
IT WAS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence adopted by this 
Court on February 17, 1971, and effective July 1, 1971, gives 
a judge considerable latitude concerning the admission or 
exclusion of evidence. Rule 45 reads: 
"Except as in these rules otherwise provided, 
the judge may in his discretion exclude 
evidence if he finds that its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the 
risk that its admission will (a} necessitate 
undue consumption of time, or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice or 
of confusing the issues or of misleading 
the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully 
surprise a party who has not had reasonable 
opportunity to anticipate that such evidence 
would be offered." 
Exhibit 35 offered by Plaintiff was a chart purportedly 
showing the gallonage sold at Delle, Utah, in 1972. Plaintiff 
claimed at the time of trial and later in its brief submitted 
to this Court that Exhibit 35 was meant to be used to establish 
a basis for comparison from which the jury could find the 
gallonage which the now-existing service station at Delle would 
pump if operated on a 24-hour basis. (Tr. 133-134 and Plaintiff's 
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brief, page 29) However, Plaintiff cannot have its cake and e~ 
it, too. Paragraph 8 of the 1974 judgment upon which Plaintiff 
relies reads in part as follows: 
"That Karl Winsness & Associates and 
M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc. hereby 
mutually release and waive any rights, 
claims or causes of action that either 
party may have or claim against the other 
for any alleged breach of any of the terms 
of the written lease of the parties dated 
the 24th day of November 1971 [,] [p] rior 
to the date of this Stipulation[.] [S]aid 
mutual release and waiver shall include 
but not be limited to the following claims: 
(8) failure to keep the station open 
24 hours a day." (Ex. P-7) (Emphasis added) 
[sic] - correction of manifest typographical 
error in judgment 
Plaintiff has also stated in its brief at page 2: 
"In 1972 a dispute arose between the 
plaintiff and defendant as to the interpre-
tation of this leasing agreement. An 
action was filed in the Third Judicial 
Court of Tooele County, Civil No. 7761, 
by plaintiffs asking for certain remedies 
against defendant. Plaintiff charged that 
the defendant had failed to maintain 24-
hour-a-day service, had failed to pay rent 
as provided in the contract, and had failed 
to build a sewage lagoon as agreed upon 
in the leasing contract." (Plaintiff's 
brief, page 2) (Emphasis added) 
Plaintiff cannot with consistency claim that in 1972 the service 
station was not being run on a 24-hour-a-day basis and then 
propose an exhibit consisting of the gallonage sold in 1972 
as evidence of what the present sales would be if the station 
were kept open 24 hours a day. 
23 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
An additional deficiency in Exhibit 35 is that it 
lacks credibility for other reasons: (1) Karl Winsness testi-
fied at trial that the new service station was opened sometime 
in July, 1972. (Tr. 96) Therefore, Exhibit 35 represented 
gallonage sold at the old service station during the first 
six and one-half months of 1972; (2) the old station was ad-
jacent to the existing restaurant facilities at Delle, which 
are approximately one-half mile from the new service station; 
(Tr. 33) (3) during 1972 the construction of the freeway was 
proceeding with many employees using the service station solely 
for this reason; (Tr. 163,227) (4) the gasoline or energy 
shortage developed in late 1973 thus making comparison with 
1972 figures precarious as the traffic patterns changed; (Tr. 
234-235) and (5) Exhibit 35 shows the gallonage sold at Delle 
skyrocketed during July and August, 1972, only to fall off 
drastically in October, November and December of that year. 
Marvin Baird, the operator of the service station and restaurant 
facilities at Timpie, Utah, was called as a witness by Plaintiff. 
He testified that his facilities are approximately seven miles 
from Delle and were first opened in October, 1972. (Tr. 325-326) 
Correlating the above-mentioned changed conditions with Exhibit 
35, it becomes apparent that during the vast majority of the 
period represented by Exhibit 35, the conditions that affected 
the amount of gallonage sold were entirely different than those 
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existing during 1974 through 1977. There is no way that validity 
could be given to this proposed Exhibit 35 for the purpose which 
Plaintiff offered it. 
CONCLUSION 
It was the duty of the Plaintiff to present a prima 
facie case concerning the Defendant's breach of the lease agree-
ment as modified by the 1974 stipulation. This it did not do, 
either as to the operation of the station or the building of 
the lagoon system. 
The record is conclusive in that not one shred of 
evidence was presented by Plaintiff to establish that the Defen-
dant was not operating the service station on a 24-hour-a-day 
basis. None of Plaintiff's witnesses could testify as to why 
the station had periodically been closed. Delle, Utah, is an 
isolated outpost between Salt Lake City and Wendover, Utah, a 
result of which is that the closures could have been for numerous 
reasons that would not have constituted a breach of the lease by 
Defendant. There was simply no evidence presented upon which 
the jury could have concluded that a breach had, in fact, occurrec 
Plaintiff also failed in its attempt to show the arno~t 
of damages, if any, occasioned by the closures of the station. 
The testimony of Plaintiff's only witness concerning damages was 
incompetent and totally lacking in credibility. The jury would 
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therefore have been left to speculate, not only as to whether 
a breach occurred, but also what damages were suffered by 
Plaintiff as a result of the breach. 
Exhibit 35 lacked any credibility whatsoever and was 
therefore properly excluded by Judge Leary pursuant to Rule 45 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The testimony concerning the lagoon system was that 
it has been built since 1974, waiting for Plaintiff to con-
struct its restaurant. The decision not to build the restaurant 
has been Plaintiff's alone and until Plaintiff has a reason to 
use the system, a lack of final approval by the Board of Health 
is of no consequence to Plaintiff. 
Judge Leary was compelled in this case, given the total 
lack of evidence presented by Plaintiff, to grant Defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict as to all five of Plaintiff's 
counts, which he did. The trial judge, under the standards 
heretofore applied and recognized under the law in acquitting 
his duty to evaluate the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff to 
determine whether a prima facie case had been made, had no choice 
but to grant Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on all 
five counts of the complaint. Plaintiff admits the validity 
of the court's action as to three of the counts. The two counts 
on which the Plaintiff challenges the lower court's action were 
equally flawed. 
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The carefully considered decision of the lower court 
is not only correct in law but applied sound and recognized 
moral and ethical standards in evaluating the contractual 
relation between the parties. The result achieved by the 
court's decision is just and equitable. The decision of the 
lower court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TIBBALS AND STATEN 
~ _,, -/ I 
. .U--/ )- • i -~ ·/~ .... 
LLEN H. TIBBALS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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